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SOME BRIEF COMMENTS ABOUT THE PRE-MERGER
NOTIFICATION PROCESSES IN MEXICO AND THE UNITED
STATES
PROFESSOR ALFRED MATHEWSON*
Mergers of large corporations in the global market place invariably invoke
scrutiny from regulators in multiple companies. With the passage of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), more merger transactions are occurring
that are subject to regulation in Mexico and the United States. These transactions
must clear pre-merger notification processes in both countries. In general, mergers
of large corporate entities must notify regulators in advance of the merger and may
not consummate it until approval by the regulators. The American process is
prescribed by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976' and the
Mexican process is set forth in Articles 20 and 21 of Federal Law of Economic
Competition (LFCE).2 This essay will give you some impressions about these pre-
merger notification processes.
The first impression deals with the perspectives that surface in the discourse
about the pre-merger notification process. The views of regulators, lawyers who
represent clients in the mergers and acquisitions process, and academics dominate
the discourse. The voices of lawyers who represent competitors and challenge
transactions, consumers, and the general public are not as loud. The discourse over
the process is different from the debate over specific transactions. These
perspectives are loudly heard voicing objections then. The difference in
perspectives is not inconsequential. The regulators and the lawyers who represent
clients in the mergers and acquisitions process want to reduce the transaction costs
generated by regulation. Regulators seem to be interested in working with them to
accomplish that goal. Consumers and the general public, on the other hand, are
concerned with low prices and not necessarily the transaction costs of the merger.
Regulators may address those concerns in making the substantive evaluation of the
anticompetitive effect of mergers when and if consumer welfare is a goal of the
process.
Indeed, most of the current global discussion pertains to the transaction costs of
competition law enforcement and compliance. There is considerable discussion
about the added costs imposed by compliance with diverse pre-merger notification
requirements to which a large global transaction may be subject. The approval
processes for these large transactions generate substantial transaction costs due to
separate sets of rules for each country involved, different time frames for the steps
in the approval process, and standards for evaluating the appropriateness of
mergers. These processes take time and increase the costs of companies trying to
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obtain approval. There is an ongoing dialogue about the need to reduce the
transaction costs of the pre-merger notification process in the United States. A
similar dialogue has begun about the Mexican system. In fact, other members of the
panel have raised some of the criticisms.
The second impression relates to the allocation of resources spent to ensure
compliance with antitrust laws. Within the United States, most antitrust
enforcement resources are allocated to the regulation of mergers, particularly the
pre-merger notification process. Seventy percent of the antitrust resources at the
FTC and the DOJ are placed in the pre-merger notification process.' That is, more
resources are allocated to the pre-merger notification process than in detecting,
enforcing, and punishing antitrust violations. Accordingly, the level of competition
or monopoly in the marketplace is a function of the allocation of resources to the
pre-merger notification process, the detection of antitrust violations, enforcement,
and sanctions. Analyzing this formula may show how the decision to put more
resources into the pre-merger notification process affects the level of competition
in the marketplace, Presumably, the level of competition in the marketplace with
the current allocation is higher than it would be with some other allocation.
Mexico appears to allocate resources differently than the United States. In
Mexico, investigation of monopolistic practices and pre-merger notification seem
to be given equal weight in the regulations, suggesting that the resources are
allocated equally between the functions. This inference may be empirically tested
by an examination of the actual allocations. It is possible that Mexico allocates
resources to the regulation of competition in the same manner as the United States.
Regardless of the amount of the particular allocation resources, the pre-merger
notification process and the associated transaction costs are a worldwide reality.
Efforts to reduce transaction costs focus on ways to streamline and coordinate all
aspects of mergers regulation, including the pre-merger notification process.
Completion of a merger involving both countries requires the companies to navigate
both processes. Some of the transaction costs may be reduced by coordination
between the regulatory agencies in both countries. Officials at the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) spend a lot
of time interfacing each day with their counterparts in other countries around the
world, including the Federal Competition Commission (CFC) in Mexico. The most
common formal tool of coordination currently used is a bi-level agreement between
the regulators of different countries. Such an agreement currently exists between
the United States and Mexico.4
Efforts continue in the United States to find ways to reduce transaction costs.
These efforts include proposed legislation introduced in Congress to raise the
threshold amount in the United States to almost $50 million. The threshold amount
in Mexico is calculated in multiples of the minimum wage and may, in fact, be
3. Enforcement: FTC Has Record Year in Enforcement in Both Merger and Non-Merger Cases, 79 ATRR
390(2000).
4. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United
Mexican States Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws (July 11, 2000).
5. See H.R. 4194, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (2000). See also S. 1854,106th Cong., 2d Sess. (2000) for even
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higher than it is in the United States.6 One of the issues raised in Mexico about the
threshold amount is how it is determined, and the cost involved in determining it.
In an effort to save time, and therefore reduce transaction costs, lawyers
representing mergers and acquisitions clients prefer not only high threshold
amounts but clearly stated threshold amounts that can be easily ascertained.
Other efforts to reduce transaction costs involve the stages of review. In a
simplified process, the merging companies would give the advance notification
containing the requisite information, and a final decision would be rendered
expeditiously. In many cases, however, a second stage is required because the
regulatory agency has questions or is unable to ascertain the anti-competitive effect
of the proposed transaction. In the second stage, the merging companies must
submit additional infornation. There is much discussion regarding the need to
bring greater clarity and definition to that second stage process. One solution may
be a maximum time frame period for the entire process. Although a maximum time
period has been advocated in the United States and Mexico, it has not been adopted.
The ambiguity of the second stage raises the issue of transparency. Transparency
is the extent to which the pre-merger notification process, the standards for
evaluating the appropriateness of the transaction, the factors influencing the
decision, are known and clear to those who must comply. In the United States,
some professionals advocate a process that requires the DOJ and FTC to provide a
detailed explanation of the reason for a second request. That is, the regulators
should not only ask for the additional information required by the second stage
review, but they should also explain why they are subjecting the transaction to the
second stage of review. Such an explanation would allow the inquiry to become
more focused. The more focused the regulatory review becomes, the less time it
will take to accomplish a transaction, and transaction costs will be reduced,
Moreover, the explanations will provide guidance to lawyers for structuring future
transactions.
Transparency in the pre-merger notification process in Mexico is a substantial
issue for American companies desiring to directly or indirectly acquire Mexican
companies. One of the major criticisms of the pre-merger notification process is the
lack of transparency for the time period for completion of the pre-merger
notification process. Article 21 of the LFCE provides a lengthy time frame for
approval by the CFC that may be extended. The length of time it takes to make a
decision in Mexico could be longer or shorter than the time frame in the United
States. The uncertainty about the time frame increases transaction costs. The lack
of transparency concerning the threshold amount triggering the pre-merger
notification process in Mexico and the time frame for its completion, make it
essential that American counsel work with knowledgeable and experienced
Mexican counsel.
In the United States, companies have a waiting period they must observe after
notification of federal regulatory agencies completing a transaction. If the FTC or
DOJ does not object within the specified period, the companies may proceed to
complete the transaction. Notwithstanding the waiting period, 97% of all merger
6. Art 21, Federal Law of Economic Competition.
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requests that go to DOJ and the FTC are approved within 30 days.' Last year, there
were almost 5,000 such requests, up from 2,000 requests ten years ago.' There is
some fluctuation from year to year, and the number of requests has declined
recently, but there has always been a very high level of approval regardless of how
many requests have been received.
The high approval rate for mergers in the United States occurs in part because the
threshold amount for the size of a merger triggering the pre-notification process is
relatively low.9 Accordingly, filing is required for transactions that do not, even on
their face, involve anti-competitive problems. On the other hand, in Mexico, more
information must be filed from the inception of the process. Assembling the
information, preparing the request, and presenting it to the regulatory agency results
in significant transaction costs. Those costs must be borne even for transactions
that present no anti-competitive problems.
Coordination among different antitrust regulators around the world raises issues
involving the exchange of information and confidentiality. When information is
submitted to a regulatory agency, it will be shared with other regulators involved
in the review process. This sharing also occurs between regulators of different
countries, often pursuant to bi-lateral agreements, Because the information
submitted may include trade secrets and other proprietary information, rules are
needed to ensure confidentiality. If the rules governing confidentiality are not clear
and safeguards are not in place, many problems may arise that will drive up
transaction costs and draw pressure from regulators and lawyers in the mergers and
acquisition process to reduce these costs. Agreements between countries must
resolve policy differences in the domestic rules of each country with respect to the
confidentiality of submitted information. Under Article X of the Cooperation
Agreement, the United States and Mexico agree to maintain the confidentiality of
information exchanged pursuant to the agreement. However, there is a gray area
because the regulators of each country need only observe that obligation to the
extent such confidentiality is consistent with their respective laws.
The evolution of competition law in Mexico has been and will continue to be
different than in the United States. In the United States, the Sherman Act'0 has had
a long history of developing domestic antitrust law. International regulation has
become more important to the American companies but it has played only a minor
role in the development of American antitrust law. In Mexico, however,
international regulation is playing a far more important role in the development of
its competition law. Mexican competition law, still in its infancy, is being
developed in an age in which globalization is a watchword and there is substantial
pressure for the harmonization of enforcement policies among the different
regulatory agencies around the world. In many instances in which a Mexican entity
will be acquired as a part of a larger transaction, multinational companies may
proceed to close deals even though the Mexican piece may not yet be resolved.
Mexican competition law necessarily will be affected. The provisions of the LFCE
7. Enforcement ICPAC Advises DOJ on Merger Review, AntitrustlTraditional Interface Directions, 78
ATRR 199 (2000).
8. See note 1 supra.
9. The threshold amount is only $15,000,000.
10. Ch. 647,26 Stat. 209(1890).
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will be interpreted in light of international and local concerns, and occasionally there
will be tensions between the goal of protecting Mexican consumers and facilitating
efficient mergers between companies outside of Mexico. Nevertheless, transactions
occurring outside of Mexico may have much to do with the manner in which
competition law develops in Mexico.
In the United States, for example, one of the things that occurred as a part of the
evolution of antitrust law is that the business of baseball in the United States has
been exempt from the antitrust laws. This result would appear to be unlikely to
occur in Mexico, but if Major League Baseball were to add an expansion team in
Mexico, the question would surely arise. Interestingly, the District Federal Court
decision in Mexico holding that notaries are not economic agents" under Article 28
of the Mexican Constitution and therefore not covered by Article 3 of the LFCE is
very similar to an example used by Justice Holmes in Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs in which the court
held that baseball was exempt from the Sherman Antitrust Act. 2 Justice Holmes
said he could see no difference between a lawyer practicing law and a professional
baseball player playing baseball. Furthermore, notaries in Mexico are comparable
to lawyers. However, Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the LFCE specifically includes
services, so Mexico would not necessarily be expected to follow the same line of
reasoning. If the question does arise in Mexico, it would evolve differently and be
resolved differently
Finally, Mexican competition law is coming of an age during when there is not
only the pressure for harmonization at the international level to coordinate
competition law enforcement in the pre-merger notification process among
regulators, but there is also pressure for a supra-national antitrust law.
Responsibility for enforcement of a supra-national antitrust law could be lodged in
the World Trade Organization. While the coordination of enforcement is a reality,
a supra-national competition law has not yet arrived. There is considerable vocal
opposition from many people who believe and argue that individualized regulation,
country by country, would be better than having one supra-national competition law
with one worldwide enforcer. Furthermore, there is resistance within countries
because the subordination of local law to a worldwide law is a big domestic political
issue. Nevertheless, scholars and academics continue to push very hard for a supra-
national law. Notwithstanding the absence of such a law, worldwide competition
law enforcement is moving towards such a model. This occurrence may cause some
of those other perspectives, i.e., lawyers who represent competitors, lawyers who
mostly litigate the transaction side of the law, consumers, or even the general public,
to become more visible in competition law enforcement discourse. This trend may
cause more people on the street, more ordinary people, to be concerned about the
allocation of resources in the pre-merger notification process and the substantive
framework in which these transactions are evaluated. This result may not occur in
Mexico, but it is already occurring in the United States.
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